As the United States Armed Forces prepare now for an uncertain future, the need for shortened and otherwise improved decision-making cycles is growing. The types of contingencies for which military forces may be tasked and the kinds of opposition forces that the Services may face in Joint and Coalition operations are changing. Certainly, pressure to shorten reaction times, tailor a light and lean reaction force, and end the contingency favorably and quickly will grow. Our Armed Forces can no longer prepare for primarily one enemy and a handful of potential conflict scenarios.
Introduction
In future military operations, the United States military will face sophisticated opposition forces that can at least delay or confound friendly coalition actions. Maintaining an information advantage and building a knowledge advantage over enemy forces will require new automated decision support tools, including some predictive modeling and simulation (M&S) systems.
Technology improvements have made development of automated decision support tools feasible. Advanced visualization, automated data retrieval, simulation of future operations, and prediction of enemy actions can be used to more effectively plan and execute modern military operations. In 1998, the Warrior Preparation Center in Germany conducted NIMBLE LION using air power simulations normally used for training to improve the Air Tasking Order (ATO) build process. NIMBLE LION was successful and was improved upon to assist planning and execution of the Air War Over Serbia (AWOS) in Operation ALLIED FORCE. Analysis support to ALLIED 
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FORCE Senior Commanders was a key innovation [Kenkel, 1999] . From both NIMBLE LION and AWOS, lessons learned point to the need for improved decision support tools. For instance, the initial NIMBLE LION after action review included findings that visualization tools initially were not adequate and ATO analysis tools were not robust [WPC, 1998 ].
Lessons learned like these, with advanced technology available as an engine for change, have reinforced the need for improved decision support tools for warfighters. The clear danger in not fielding adequate decision support tools for operations -perhaps waiting for that "ideal" new tool in development --can be a lengthy or flawed planning process and slow reaction to enemy provocation. Future enemies may not allow several months for coalition force beddown as in DESERT STORM nor provide the opportunity to endure poor tanker orbit locations for many days into the operation as in AWOS [Begert, 1999] . The success of using training simulations for decision support in NIMBLE LION and a dedicated analysis section in ALLIED FORCE points toward some key next steps in improving decision support to the warfighter.
Establishing clear requirements for decision support tools for warfighters and testing and experimenting with candidate solutions are the next logical steps. The paper will begin this definition process with a discussion of how command and control (C2) is structured in a typical contingency and a hypothetical storyboard of a developing, potential contingency operation.
The main actors in the contingency response, the issues they face, and the types of automated decision tools that could accelerate and improve contingency response will be summarized in order to explain how these tools might be used.
Then, two ways of describing the requirements will be discussed. First, decision support tool requirements will be described in terms of the six steps used for crisis action planning (CAP): situation development, crisis development, course of action (COA) development, COA selection, execution planning, and execution. Tools that can improve the effectiveness of CAP can be discussed in detail for each stage. Alternatively, the decision support tool requirements will be listed and referenced to the Air Force Tasks and Subtasks relating to Command and Control from Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1. Decision support tool requirements can be generalized as capability needs for efficient population and update of databases, automated tools for logistics decision making, COA analysis, ATO options and quality control, and visualization of analysis. Subtasks can be further refined into detailed requirements for decision support tools.
Requirements for Decision Support Tools
Regional Commander in Chief (CINC), Air Force Major Command, and Numbered Air Force (NAF) staffs monitor situations within their areas of responsibility. When a potential crisis begins to develop --whether in response to a natural disaster, combat, or mixture of these -responsible headquarters build knowledge of the situation and area, and they evaluate options. Components will participate as part of the designated Joint or Coalition team, and specific "deliverables" are expected from these components, which conduct military operations in order to satisfy higher headquarters (HHQ) objectives. A depiction of general types of AFFOR/JFACC "deliverables" is in Figure 2 . While contingency response may simplistically be viewed as a planning task followed distinctly by a series of execution phases, in reality, contingency response requires continuous planning and analysis of execution. The previous COA or commanders' objectives may change, or daily priorities may shift; and missions can be redirected in minutes. Campaign objectives, plans, and daily execution are examined in light of changing battlespace circumstances. This interrelationship of planning and execution is depicted in Figure 3 . Military operations are seldom against a "stationary enemy", and future opponents will undoubtedly pursue asymmetric attacks against United States or Coalition military weak points (vice symmetric strength against strength, attrition attacks). Our forces' power and success in conflicts may well be based on the ability to anticipate enemy actions, mask coalition weak points, defend against asymmetric attacks, and make decisions faster than opposition forces.
Storyboard of Decision Support Tool Uses in Contingency Response
Currently, AOCs have automated tools that help generate ACOs and ATOs and projection systems for graphics portrayal. Beyond that, map boards, Post-It notes, and "sand" tables are used for situational awareness. Other tools can improve contingency response. The storyboard at Figure 4 is designed to illustrate the types of tools that are required for one selected contingency story. 
Decision Support Tool Requirements Linked to Crisis Action Planning Phases
Decision support tools will be used to accelerate contingency response, influence Joint Force planning, and improve execution, allowing future commanders to preempt, prevent, and overwhelm adversaries. The Advanced Battlespace Information System Task Force has described the types of decision support tools needed for contingency response: Ex xe ec cu ut ti io on n P Pl la an nn ni in ng g • JFACC develops ATO 1, 2, 3… • Visualize ACOs, looking for ineffective or problematic airspace use • Screen ATOs for accuracy and to ensure they achieve JFC's desired effects • Use predictive tools: gain spatial/temporal advantage to control/defeat enemy strategy • Evaluate options and brainstorm enemy actions Using analytic support -combat analysis -and the right decision support tools can accelerate CAP and help commanders "experience the unexpected" through simulation excursions, improving combat effectiveness. Tactical flight leads who test-fly their combat mission via simulation and "see" the target area via imagery have considerable advantage over those that just map study. Similarly, JFACCs can "test fly" COAs, ATOs, and ACOs…and better leverage their forces.
Decision Support Tool Requirements Linked to Needs and Air Force Tasks
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As an alternative, one can look at decision support tools for military operations by grouping similar requirements and cross-referencing these to the relevant Air Force Task (AFT). This type of grouping is illustrated below at a very general level. These requirements and the Air Force Tasks (see Appendix I) can be expanded into a much more detailed listing of needs.
• Efficient population and update of databases (AFT 7.1.1)
• Data sharing across C2, ISR, M&S
• Automated tools for logistics decision making (AFT 7.3.2)
• Beddown of forces; aerial ports of debarkation
• Closure of forces and supplies; force support, re-supply
• Course of action analysis (AFT 7.3.3, 7.3.4 and 7.3.5) • For pure MOOTW: logistics and ISR alternatives
• For warfighting: force structure, ISR, employment options
• ATO options and quality control (AFT 7.4.1)
•
Test-fly ATO options; what-if analysis of variations
• Test-fly the ATO prior to release or prior to execution
• Visualization of analysis (AFT 7.1.1, 7.1.4, 7.1.5)
Decision Support Tool Requirements Relating to Prediction
Most of the decision support tool needs for military operations can be fielded using current commercial or military systems with modifications and process changes. Connectivity and automated data exchange between C2, information, and M&S systems are technically achievable, yet not trivial. The Advanced Battlespace Information System Task Force Report states that the need for predictive decision support will increase because commanders need Yet, in order to meet this challenge and field capabilities, analytic support to military operations must be institutionalized, practiced in wargames, experiments, and exercises, and then adapted to serve operational commanders. M&S support to assist the analysts in predicting enemy actions and coalition needs is a current shortcoming that will only be overcome by attempting to mold current commercial and military simulations into the needed predictive operational toolkit. Analysts serving operational commanders will improve the operational M&S toolkit through use in wargames, experiments, exercises, and operations.
In many cases, predictive tools may be very capable in screening the ATO for errors of tasking or scheduling, yet very weak in determining if the ATO is one step in the right direction in achieving JFC objectives. Simulation may be limited in its ability to predict enemy actions, yet surprisingly capable in highlighting enemy threats that were not eliminated in the correct order for friendly force survival. In operations other that war, where the enemy can be hunger, disease, suffering, or death, simulation is especially weak in predicting outcomes. Yet, as our forces and the analytic shops that support them gain experience in using a simulation toolkit for operations, workarounds and acceptable limitations will be understood.
Numerous decision support tools are developed or fielded each year (see Appendix II), and a dedicated testbed for these tools and analysis shops for operational commanders can be used to screen and evaluate these tools. The dedicated testbed and analysis shops would eventually lead to configuration control and reduced unnecessary duplication. Improvements in decision support for contingency response will come much sooner with use than with waiting for the ideal simulation to be developed. Predictive tools will help commanders understand an array of futures, typical enemy actions, and key coalition weakness to mask or protect. M&S for decision support can help lesson uncertainty, and General Michael Ryan has said, "Our people need to be trained to deal with uncertainty and the unpredictable." 
Conclusion
The uncertain future we prepare for now may include very capable adversaries who will not pause between punches nor provide the United States or our coalition partners preparation time comparable to that of recent conflicts. Time will be an enemy in all military operations, and decision support tools that improve our decision cycles will be a weapon in our arsenal -perhaps the most important new weapon. The requirements for decision support tools can be described in terms of the stages of crisis action planning, in terms of functional needs, and linked to the Air Force task list. Many of the requirements for these decision support tools can be met with modifications to current commercial or military systems. Linkages of databases, automatic realtime updates of data, and connectivity must be worked; but these improvements are technically feasible today. A designated Center of Expertise for Decision Support could provide the C2 testbed to engineer decision support tools and provide them to wargames, experiments, exercises, and operations. The most striking limitations of what the United States military and coalition partners will be able to field for decision support are in the predictive analysis and M&S areas. Solutions to these shortcomings will be realized faster if selected M&S tools are used by a dedicated analysis shop in wargames, experiments, exercises, and operations so that combat analysis teams linked to the operational commander can test, modify, and improve the M&S toolkit. In the end, we will need to designate a suite of decision support tools including a toolkit of M&S predictive tools used by a faithful analysis shop. Operational commanders need the right
